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Is there a world business
cycle?
by Michael Kouparitsas
In 1999, the year the euro zone was
officially launched, the European
Central Bank (ECB) had to fashion
a single policy for a diverse region
where the growth rates of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) ranged from
10.8% in Ireland to 1.6% in Italy. At
the time, many commentators ques-
tioned the viability of the ECB since
its one-size-fits-all monetary policy
would likely have negative conse-
quences for part of the zone and
positive consequences for the rest.
Three years later the economies of
the euro zone are finally starting to
move in step, with the forecast differ-
ential between high- and low-growth
countries narrowing to half of that
recorded in 1999.1 The good news is
that this convergence should make it
a lot easier for the ECB to formulate
a single monetary policy for the re-
gion.2 The bad news is that the euro
zone is heading in the wrong direc-
tion, with output growth forecast to
slow for all countries in the region
this year.
Looking beyond the euro zone we see
that every corner of the global econ-
omy is slowing down. In the third quar-
ter of last year, the U.S. economy
slowed dramatically, foreshadowing
the end of the rapid expansion that
began in the mid-1990s. According
to the latest Consensus forecasts,3 U.S.
GDP is expected to grow by 1% this
year, down from 4% or more record-
ed in each of the last four years. The
spillover effects of the U.S. and euro-
zone slowdowns, especially through
lower demand for electronic goods,
are clearly evident in the weakening
economies of North America, Latin
America, and Asia. There are many
examples. The most dramatic are
the current slowdowns in Mexico
and Taiwan—two countries that had
emerged virtually unscathed from
the recent financial crises that ravaged
other countries in their regions. Af-
ter growing by just under 7% in 2000,
Mexican GDP is expected to grow by
0.1% this year, while Taiwan GDP is
expect to contract by 1.9% after grow-
ing by 6% in 2000.
Readers may remember that the last
time economic activity slowed in the
U.S. was in the early 1990s, about the
same time that activity in Europe was
slowing in response to German reuni-
fication. Armed with these observa-
tions, a casual observer might conclude
that there is a world business cycle.
From a U.S. perspective, this means
that when the U.S. expands, the rest
of the world expands; and when the
U.S. contracts, the rest of the world
contracts. In exploring whether this
is so, this Chicago Fed Letter uses mod-
ern trend/cycle decomposition techniques
to isolate the cyclical components of
output data for various countries and
regions and estimate the correlation
coefficients of their cyclical fluctua-
tions. I provide some perspective on
the relative strength of the correla-
tion coefficients by comparing them
with similar statistics for U.S. indus-
trial sectors and across total income
of U.S. regions.
Measuring cyclical fluctuations
The theoretical and empirical analysis
of cyclical fluctuations, known as busi-
ness cycle theory, is one of the more con-
tentious fields of economics. There
are many competing theories of the
business cycle and, despite the age of
the debate, there is little consensus
on the causes of cyclical fluctuations.
The only restriction theory imposes
on empirical methods is that trend and
cyclical terms be independent.
The trend/cycle decomposition meth-
odology I use here follows this tradi-
tion, which can be traced from Burns
and Mitchell’s pioneering definition
of the business cycle.4 According to
them, a business cycle consists of ex-
pansions occurring at about the same
time in many economic activities, fol-
lowed by similarly general contrac-
tions. This sequence of changes is
recurrent but not periodic and has
duration of 18 months to eight years.
Burns and Mitchell relied on ad hoc
methods that are no longer used to
isolate cyclical fluctuations in data. A
more formal approach, widely used to-
day, was introduced in the early 1980s
by Kydland and Prescott.5 They over-
came the shortcomings of earlier meth-
ods by using so-called business cycle
band-pass filters that more effectively
isolate fluctuations at the business cy-
cle frequencies of between 18 months
and eight years, while preserving all
other features of the business cycle.
I begin my analysis by exploring the
U.S. industrial business cycle. I do this
by applying a business cycle band-pass
filter to U.S. sectoral labor hours data.6
These data cover six broad goods-
and service-producing sectors that
account for 97% of all private sector
workers in the U.S. economy: nondu-
rable manufacturing, durable manu-
facturing, construction, transportation
and utilities, FIRE (trade, finance, in-
surance, and real estate), and other ser-
vices. Following Burns and Mitchell,
I use fluctuations in one sector as the
reference cycle, in this case the dura-
ble goods sector. With the exception
of FIRE, which has a correlation coef-
ficient of 0.51, I find a high correla-



















































Note: Industrial production data filtered using the monthly business cycle band-pass filter described
in Baxter and King (1999).









for other services and durable man-
ufacturing to 0.85 for durable and
nondurable manufacturing. (A coef-
ficient of 1.0 would be a perfect cor-
relation). Since FIRE accounts for
only 6% of total non-farm employ-
ment, these results clearly support the
view that the U.S. has a business cycle.7
Is the business cycle confined to
industrial activity?
Burns and Mitchell did not look be-
yond industrial data in their seminal
work, but they raised the question of
whether U.S. regions had their own
business cycles. Subsequent research
has investigated the closely related
question of whether cyclical fluctua-
tions of regional economic activity
within a country are correlated. I up-
date this exercise using a band-pass
filter to isolate the cyclical fluctua-
tions of quarterly real personal in-
come data for the eight Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) regions
and the reference cycle of total U.S.
personal income. The evidence in
favor of a business cycle is even
stronger in the regional data, with
the eight BEA regions displaying rel-
atively high correlation coefficients,
ranging from 0.77 in the Southwest
to 0.98 in the Southeast.
Further data analysis reveals that the
highly correlated cyclical fluctuations
of U.S. regions are the product of
similar sources of economic distur-
bance and similar responses to these
disturbances across all regions.8 A
highlight of these results is that the
estimated effects of monetary policy
are similar in all U.S. regions, which
makes it easier for the Federal Reserve
to formulate its one-size-fits-all mon-
etary policy. In fact, my analysis indi-
cates that the single currency area
launched by the signing of the U.S.
Federal Reserve Act by President
Woodrow Wilson in 1913 closely ap-
proximates Robert Mundell’s notion
of an optimal currency area. This sug-
gests that any macroeconomic costs
associated with the U.S. monetary
union are greatly outweighed by the
microeconomic benefits of using a
single currency.9
Is there an international
business cycle?
Burns and Mitchell also raised the ques-
tion of whether a nation was too small
rather than too large a geographic
unit to display systematic cyclical be-
havior, thereby suggesting that busi-
ness cycles might be best observed
using international data. There are
various ways to approach the question
of whether there is an international
business cycle. One approach is to re-
peat the analysis of the previous two
sections using international output
data. I do this in figure 1, by plotting
the cyclical fluctuations of quarterly
real industrial production for six of
the G7 (Group of Seven) countries
against the reference cycle, which in
this case is the cyclical component of
U.S. industrial production.10 With the
exception of Canada, I find that the
correlations of G7 and U.S. cyclical
fluctuations are lower than those of
the eight U.S. BEA regions. Excluding
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flexible exchange rate period
2. Correlation with the U.S.
fixed exchange rate period
Note: Industrial production data filtered using the monthly business
cycle band-pass filter described in Baxter and King (1999).
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5See R. J. Hodrick and E. C. Prescott, 1997,
“Postwar U.S. business cycles: An empiri-
cal investigation,” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1–16.
range from 0.39 for the U.S. and
Germany to 0.59 for the U.S. and UK.
The correlation coefficient for U.S.–
Canada industrial production is con-
siderably higher at 0.87.
Some authors argue, largely on the
strength of theoretical results, that
the end of the Bretton Woods (BW)
fixed exchange rate system in the ear-
ly 1970s caused significant structural
change in the global economy. They
recommend dividing the sample into
the BW and post-Bretton Woods (PBW)
exchange rate eras when assessing
the extent of the international busi-
ness cycle. Figure 2 describes the
cross-country correlation coefficients
for G7 industrial production in the
fixed and flexible exchange rate pe-
riods (the U.S. is the reference cy-
cle). With the obvious exception of
Canada, I find that the cross-country
correlation coefficients of cyclical fluc-
tuations of U.S.–G7 industrial produc-
tion are considerably higher in the
flexible exchange rate period. For ex-
ample, the U.S.–Japan correlation ris-
es from –0.24 in the BW era to 0.64
in the PBW period. On the other hand,
the U.S.–Canada correlation coeffi-
cient is roughly unchanged over the
two periods. With correlation coeffi-
cients ranging from 0.55 to 0.78, the
PBW data provide strong evidence
in support of an international busi-
ness cycle.
Further analysis suggests that the
higher correlation of U.S.–G7 out-
put fluctuations emerged in the PBW
period due to a combination of two
factors.11 First, the sensitivity to U.S.
monetary policy shocks among the
rest of the G7 countries remained
unchanged over the fixed and flexi-
ble exchange rate regimes, but the
volatility of shocks to U.S. monetary
policy increased significantly rela-
tive to country-specific shocks over
the flexible exchange rate period.
This made U.S. monetary policy dis-
turbances a more important source
of variation for G7 industrial pro-
duction and, in the process, raised
the correlation of U.S.–G7 output
fluctuations. Second, the responses
of the G7 to all shocks, global and
domestic, changed in the flexible
exchange rate period, so that they
became more alike than in the fixed
exchange rate period.
Is there an industrial developing-
country business cycle?
In a closely related study, I find that
the international business cycle ex-
tends to the develop-
ing region of the
world, by showing that
the growth rates of
output for the broad
industrial and devel-
oping regions of the
world are highly cor-
related.12 Using sec-
toral data, I show that
the industrial devel-
oping-country busi-
ness cycle is supported
by a strong positive
correlation of the





of the growth rates
of services output.
Conclusion
The current slowdown in global eco-
nomic activity has renewed interest in
the notion of a world business cycle.
Data presented here suggests that there
is a business cycle across major indus-
trial countries. Similarly, results from
an earlier study on the relationship be-
tween cyclical fluctuations in the in-
dustrial and developing regions of the
world suggests that there is an indus-
trial developing-region business cycle.
Overall, these studies provide evidence
to support the claim that there is a
world business cycle.6I use a variant of the Kydland–Prescott
filter developed by Baxter and King. For
details, see M. Baxter and R. G. King,
1999, “Measuring business cycles: Approx-
imate band-pass filters for economic time
series,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 575–593.
7For more discussion of these data and
their implications for theoretical expla-
nations of the U.S. business cycle see,
L. J. Christiano and T. J. Fitzgerald, 1998,
“The business cycle is still a puzzle,”
Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 56–83.
8Kouparitsas (1999).
9See, R. A. Mundell, 1961, “A theory of
optimum currency areas,” American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 657–665.
10The Baxter–King filter is approximated
by a two-sided moving average, with a lag
length of three years, so I lose the first
and last three years of observations.
11For details see, M. A. Kouparitsas, 1998,
“Are business cycles different under
fixed and flexible exchange rate re-
gimes?,” Economic Perspectives, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 22, No. 1,
pp. 46–64.
12For details see, M. A. Kouparitsas, 2000,
“Evidence of the North–South business
cycle,” Economic Perspectives, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 25, No. 1,
pp. 46–59.
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